Sanctifying Grace
Grace (gratia, Charis), in general, is a supernatural gift of God to intellectual
creatures (men, angels) for their eternal salvation, whether the latter be furthered
and attained through salutary acts or a state of holiness. Eternal salvation itself
consists in heavenly bliss resulting from the intuitive knowledge of the Triune
God, who to the one not endowed with grace "inhabiteth light inaccessible" (I
Tim., vi, 16). Christian grace is a fundamental idea of the Christian religion, the
pillar on which, by a special ordination of God, the majestic edifice of Christianity
rests in its entirety. Among the three fundamental ideas -- sin, redemption, and
grace -- grace plays the part of the means, indispensable and Divinely ordained,
to effect the redemption from sin through Christ and to lead men to their eternal
destiny in heaven.
Before the Council of Trent, the Schoolmen seldom used the term gratia actualis,
preferring auxilium speciale, motio divina, and similar designations; nor did they
formally distinguish actual grace from sanctifying grace. But, in consequence of
modern controversies regarding grace, it has become usual and necessary in
theology to draw a sharper distinction between the transient help to act (actual
grace) and the permanent state of grace (sanctifying grace). For this reason we
adopt this distinction as our principle of division in our exposition of the Catholic
doctrine. In this article, we shall treat only of sanctifying grace. (See also
ACTUAL GRACE.)
Santifying grace
Since the end and aim of all efficacious grace is directed to the production of
sanctifying grace where it does not already exist, or to retain and increase it
where it is already present, its excellence, dignity, and importance become
immediately apparent; for holiness and the sonship of God depend solely upon
the possession of sanctifying grace, wherefore it is frequently called simply grace
without any qualifying word to accompany it as, for instance, in the phrases "to
live in grace" or "to fall from grace".
All pertinent questions group themselves around three points of view from which
the subject may be considered:
I. The preparation for sanctifying grace, or the process of
justification.
II. The nature of sanctifying grace.
III. The characteristics of sanctifying grace.
I. JUSTIFICATION: THE PREPARATION FOR SANCTIFYING GRACE
(For an exhaustive treatment of justification, see the article JUSTIFICATION).
The word justification (justificatio, from justum facere) derives its name from
justice (justitia), by which is not merely meant the cardinal virtue in the sense of
a contant purpose to respect the rights of others (suum cuique), nor is the term
taken in the concept of all those virtues which go to make up the moral law, but
connotes, especially, the whole inner relation of man to God as to his
supernatural end. Every adult soul stained either with original sin or with actual
mortal sin (children are of course excepted) must, in order to arrive at the state of
justification, pass through a short or long process of justification, which may be
likened to the gradual development of the child in its mother's womb. This
development attains its fullness in the birth of the child, accompanied by the
anguish and suffering with which this birth is invariably attended; our rebirth in
God is likewise preceded by great spiritual sufferings of fear and contrition.
In the process of justification we must distinguish two periods: first, the
preparatory acts or dispositions (faith, fear, hope, etc.); then the last, decisive
moment of the transformation of the sinner from the state of sin to that of
justification or sanctifying grace, which may be called the active justification
(actus justificationis) with this the real process comes to an end, and the state of
habitual holiness and sonship of God begins. Touching both of these periods
there has existed, and still exists, in part, a great conflict of opinion between
Catholicism and Protestantism. This conflict may be reduced to four differences
of teaching. By a justifying faith the Church understands qualitatively the
theoretical faith in the truths of Revelation, and demands over and above this faith
other acts of preparation for justification. Protestantism, on the other hand,
reduces the process of justification to merely a fiduciary faith; and maintains that
this faith, exclusive even of good works, is all-sufficient for justification, laying
great stress upon the scriptural statement sola fides justificat. The Church
teaches that justification consists of an actual obliteration of sin and an interior
sanctification. Protestantism, on the other hand, makes of the forgiveness of sin
merely a concealment of it, so to speak; and of the sanctification a forensic
declaration of justification, or an external imputation of the justice of Christ. In the
presentation of the process of justification, we will everywhere note this fourfold
confessional conflict.
A. The Fiduciary Faith of the Protestants
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vi, and can. xii) decrees that not the
fiduciary faith, but a real mental act of faith, consisting of a firm belief in all
revealed truths makes up the faith of justification and the "beginning, foundation,
and source" (loc. cit., cap. viii) of justification. What did the Reformers with
Luther understand by fiduciary faith? They understood thereby not the first or
fundamental deposition or preparation for the (active) justification, but merely the
spiritual grasp (instrumentum) with which we seize and lay hold of the external
justice of Christ and with it, as with a mantle of grace, cover our sins (which still
continue to exist interiorly) in the infallible, certain belief (fiducia) that God, for the
sake of Christ, will no longer hold our sin against us. Hereby the seat of justifying
faith is transferred from the intellect to the will; and faith itself, in as far as it still
abides in the intellect, is converted into a certain belief in one's own justification.
The main question is: "Is this conception Biblical?" Murray (De gratia, disp. x, n.
18, Dublin, 1877) states in his statistics that the word fides (pistis) occurs eighty
times in the Epistle to the Romans and in the synoptic Gospels, and in only six
of these can it be construed to mean fiducia. But neither here nor anywhere else
does it ever mean the conviction of, or belief in, one's own justification, or the
Lutheran fiduciary faith. Even in the leading text (Rom., iv, 5) the justifying faith of
St. Paul is identical with the mental act of faith or belief in Divine truth; for
Abraham was justified not by faith in his own justification, but by faith in the truth
of the Divine promise that he would be the "father of many nations" (cf. Rom., iv,
9 sqq.). In strict accord with this is the Pauline teaching that the faith of
justification, which we must profess "with heart and mouth", is identical with the
mental act of faith in the Resurrection of Christ, the central dogma of Christianity
(Rom., x, 9 sq.) and that the minimum expressly necessary for justification is
contained in the two dogmas: the existence of God, and the doctrine of eternal
reward (Heb., xi, 6).
The Redeemer Himself made belief in the teaching of the gospel a necessary
condition for salvation, when he solemnly commanded the Apostles to preach the
Gospel to the whole world (Mark, xvi, 15). St. John the Evangelist declares his
Gospel has been written for the purpose of exciting belief in the Divine Sonship of
Christ, and links to this faith the possession of eternal life (John, xx, 31). Such
was the mind of the Chritian Church from the beginning. To say nothing of the
testimony of the Fathers (cf. Bellarmine, De justific., I, 9), Saint Fulgentius, a
disciple of St. Augustine, in his precious booklet, "De vera fide ad Petrum", does
not understand by true faith a fiduciary faith, but the firm belief in all the truths
contained in the Apostles' Creed, and he calls this faith the "Foundation of all
good things", and the "Beginning of human salvation" (loc. cit., Prolog.). The
practice of the Church in the earliest ages, as shown by the ancient custom,
going back to Apostolic times, of giving the catechumens (katechoumenoi from
katechein, viva voce instruere) a verbal instruction in the articles of faith and of
directing them, shortly before baptism, to make a public recitation of the
Apostles' Creed, strengthens this view. After this they were called not fiduciales
but fideles, in contra-distinction to infidels and haeretici (from aireisthai, to
select, to proceed eclectically) who rejected Revelation as a whole or in part.
In answer to the theological question: How many truths of faith must one
expressly (fide explicita) believe under command (necessitate praecepti)?
theologians say that an ordinary Catholic must expressly know and believe the
most important dogmas and the truths of the moral law, for instance, the
Apostles' Creed, the Decalogue, the six precepts of the Church, the Seven
Sacraments, the Our Father. Greater things are, of course, expected from the
educated, especially from catechists, confessors, preachers wherefore upon
these the study of theology rests as an obligation. If the question be put: In how
many truths as a means (necessitate medii) must one believe to be saved?
many catechists answer Six things: God's existence; an eternal reward; the
Trinity; the Incarnation; the immortality of the soul; the necessity of Grace. But
according to St. Paul (Heb., xi, 6) we can only be certain of the necessity of the
first two dogmas, while the belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation could not of
course be exacted from ante-Christian Judaism or from Paganism. Then, too,
belief in the Trinity may be implicitly included in the dogma of God's existence,
and belief in the Incarnation in the dogma of the Divine providence, just as the
immortality of the soul is implicitly included in the dogma of an eternal reward.
However, there arises for any one baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, and
entering thus the Church of Christ, the necessity of making an act of explicit faith
(fides explicita). This necessity (necessitas medii) arises per accidens, and is
suspended only by a Divine dispention in cases of extreme necessity, where
such an act of faith is either physically or morally impossible, as in the case of
pagans or those dying in a state of unconsciousness. For further matter on this
point see Pohle, "Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", 4th ed., II, 488 sqq. (Paderborn,
1909).
B. The "Sola Fides" Doctrine of the Protestants
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. ix) decrees that over and above the faith
which formally dwells in the intellect, other acts of predisposition, arising from the
will, such as fear, hope, love, contrition, and good resolution (loc. cit., cap. vi),
are necessary for the reception of the grace of justification. This definition was
made by the council as against the second fundamental error of Protestantism,
namely that "faith alone justifies" (sola fides justificat).
Martin Luther stands as the originator of the doctrine of justification by faith
alone, for he hoped that in this way he might be able to calm his own
conscience, which was in a state of great perturbation, and consequently he took
refuge behind the assertion that the necessity of good works over and above
mere faith was altogether a pharisaical supposition. Manifestly this did not bring
him the peace and comfort for which he had hoped, and at least it brought no
conviction to his mind; for many times, in a spirit of honesty and sheer good
nature, he applauded good works, but recognized them only as necessary
concomitants, not as efficient dispositions, for justification. This was also the
tenor of Calvin's interpretation (Institute, III, 11, 19). Luther was surprised to find
himelf by his unprecedented doctrine in direct contradiction to the Bible, therefore
he rejected the Epistle of St. James as "one of straw" and into the text of St.
Paul to the Romans (iii, 28) he boldly inserted the word alone. This falsification of
the Bible was certainly not done in the spirit of the Apostle's teaching, for
nowhere does St. Paul teach that faith alone (without charity) will bring
justification, even though we should accept as also Pauline the text given in a
different context, that supernatural faith alone justifies but the fruitless works of
the Jewish Law do not.
In this statement St. Paul emphasizes the fact that grace is purely gratuitous;
that no merely natural good works can merit grace; but he does not state that no
other acts in their nature and purport predisposing are necessary for justification
over and above the requisite faith. Any other construction of the above passage
would be violent and incorrect. If Luther's interpretation were allowed to stand,
then St. Paul would come into direct contradiction not only with St. James (ii, 24
sqq.), but also with himself; for, except St. John, the favourite Apostle, he is the
most outspoken of all Apostles in proclaiming the necessity and excellence of
charity over faith in the matter of justification (cf. I Cor., xiii, l sqq.). Whenever
faith justifies it is not faith alone, but faith made operative and replenished by
charity (cf. Gal., v 6, "fides, quae per caritatem operatur"). In the painest
language the Apostle St. James says this: "ex operibus justificatur homo, et non
ex fide tantum" (James, ii, 24); and here, by works, he does not understand the
pagan good works to which St. Paul refers in the Epistle to the Romans, or the
works done in fulfilment of the Jewish Law, but the-works of salvation made
possible by the operation of supernatural grace, which was recognized by St.
Augustine (lib. LXXXIII, Q. lxxvi n. 2). In conformity with this interpretation and
with this only is the tenor of the Scriptural doctrine, namely, that over and above
faith other acts are necessary for justification, such as fear (Ecclus., i, 28), and
hope (Rom., viii, 24), charity (Luke, vii, 47), penance with contrition (Luke, xiii, 3;
Acts, ii, 38; iii, 19), almsgiving (Dan., iv, 24; Tob., xii, 9). Without charity and the
works of charity faith is dead. Faith receives life only from and through charity
(James, ii, 26). Only to dead faith (fides informis) is the doctrine applied: "Faith
alone does not justify". On the other hand, faith informed by charity (fides
formata) has the power of justification. St. Augustine (De Trinit., XV, 18)
expresses it pithily thus: "Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse, sed
non et prodesse." Hence we see that from the very beginning the Church has
taught that not only faith but that a sincere conversion of heart effected by charity
and contrition is also requisite for justification--witness the regular method of
administering baptism and the discipline of penance in the early Church.
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. viii) has, in the light of Revelation, assigned
to faith the only correct status in the process of justification, inasmuch as the
council, by declaring it to be the "beginning, the foundation, and the root", has
placed faith at the very front in the whole process.
Faith is the beginning of salvation, because no one can be converted to God
unless he recognize Him as his supernatural end and aim, just as a mariner
without an objective and without a compass wanders aimlessly over the sea at
the mercy of wind and wave. Faith is not only the initiatory act of justification, but
the foundation as well, because upon it all the other predisposing acts rest
securely, not in geometric regularity or inert as the stones of a building rest upon
a foundation, but organically and imbued with life as the branches and blossoms
spring from a root or stem. Thus there is preserved to faith in the Catholic system
its fundamental and co-ordinating significance in the matter of justification. A
masterly, psychological description of the whole process of justification, which
even Ad. Harnack styles "a magnificent work of art", will be found in the famous
cap. vi, "Disponuntur" (Denzinger, n. 798). According to this the process of
justification follows a regular order of progression in four stages: from faith to fear,
from fear to hope, from hope to incipient charity, from incipient charity to
contrition with purpose of amendment. If the contrition be perfect (contritio
caritate perfecta), then active justification results, that is, the soul is immediately
placed in the state of grace even before the reception of the sacrament of
baptism or penance, though not without the desire for the sacrament (votum
sacramenti). If, on the other hand, the contrition be only an imperfect one
(attritio), then the sanctifying grace can only be imparted by the actual reception
of the sacrament (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cc. iv and xiv). The Council of Trent had no
intention, however, of making the sequence of the various stages in the process
of justification, given above, inflexible; nor of making any one of the stages
indispensable. Since a real conversion is inconceivable without faith and
contrition, we naturally place faith at the beginning and contrition at the end of
the process. In exceptional cases, however, for example in sudden conversions,
it is quite possible for the sinner to overlap the intervening stages between faith
and charity, in which case fear, hope, and contrition are virtually included in
charity.
The "justification by faith alone" theory was by Luther styled the article of the
standing and falling church (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae), and by his
followers was regarded as the material principle of Protestantism, just as the
sufficiency of the Bible without tradition was considered its formal principle. Both
of these principles are un-Biblical and are not accepted anywhere to-day in their
original severity, save only in the very small circle of orthodox Lutherans.
The Lutheran Church of Scandinavia has, according to the Swedish theologian
Krogh-Tonningh, experienced a silent reformation which in the lapse of the
several centuries has gradually brought it back to the Catholic view of
justification, which view alone can be supported by Revelation and Christian
experience (cf. Dorner, "Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie", 361 sqq.,
Munich, 1867; Mohler, "Symbolik", 16, Mainz, 1890; "Realencyk. fur prot.
Theol.", s.v. "Rechtfertigung").
C. The Protestant Theory of Non-Imputation
Embarrassed by the fatal notion that original sin wrought in man an utter
destruction extending even to the annihilation of all moral freedom of election,
and that it continues its existence even in the just man as sin in the shade of an
ineradicable concupiscence, Martin Luther and Calvin taught very logically that a
sinner is justified by fiduciary faith, in such a way, however, that sin is not
absolutely removed or wiped out, but merely covered up or not held against the
sinner. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, however, in active
justification an actual and real forgiveness of sins takes place so that the sin is
really removed from the soul, not only original sin by baptism but also mortal sin
by the sacrament of penance (Trent, Sess. V, can. v; Sess. VI, cap. xiv; Sess.
XIV, cap. ii). This view is entirely consonant with the teaching of Holy Scripture,
for the Biblical expressions: "blotting out" as applied to sin (Ps., 1, 3; Is., xliii,
25; xliv, 22; Acts, iii, 19), "exhausting" (Heb., ix, 28), "taking away" [II Kings, xii,
13; I Par., xxi, 8; Mich., vii, 18; Ps. x (Heb.), 15; cii, 12], cannot be reconciled
with the idea of a mere covering up of sin which is supposed to continue its
existence in a covert manner. Other Biblical expressions are just as
irreconcilable with this Lutheran idea, for instance, the expression of "cleansing"
and "washing away" the mire of sin (Ps., 1, 4, 9; Is., i, 18; Ezech., xxxvi, 25; I
Cor., vi 11; Apoc., i, 5), that of coming "from death to life" (Col. ii., 13; I John, iii,
14); the removal from darkness to light (Eph., v, 9). Especially these latter
expressions are significant, because they characterize the justification as a
movement from one thing to another which is directly contrary or opposed to the
thing from which the movement is made. The opposites, black and white, night
and day, darkness and light, life and death, have this peculiarity, that the
presence of one means the extinction of its opposite. Just as the sun dispels all
darkness, so does the advent of justifying grace drive away sin, which ceases
from that on to have an existence at least in the ethical order of things, though in
the knowledge of God it may have a shadowy kind of existence as something
which once was, but has ceased to be. It becomes intelligible, therefore, that in
him who is justified, though concupiscence remain, there is "no condemnation"
(Rom., viii, l); and why, according to James (i, 14 sqq.), concupiscence as such
is really no sin; and it is apparent that St. Paul (Rom., vii, 17) is speaking only
figuratively when he calls concupiscence sin, because it springs from sin and
brings sin in its train. Where in the Bible the expressions "covering up" and "not
imputing" sin occur, as for instance in Ps. xxxi, 1 sq., they must be interpreted
in accordance with the Divine perfections, for it is repugnant that God should
declare any one free from sin to whom sin is still actually cleaving. It is one of
God's attributes always to substantiate His declarations; if He covers sin and
does not impute it, this can only be effected by an utter extinction or blotting out
of the sin. Tradition also has always taught this view of the forgiveness of sins.
(See Denifle, "Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther uber justitia Dei
and justificatio", Mainz, 1905)
4. The Protestant Theory of Imputation
Calvin rested his theory with the negative moment, holding that justification ends
with the mere forgiveness of sin, in the sense of not imputing the sin; but other
Reformers (Luther and Melanchthon) demanded a positive moment as well,
concerning the nature of which there was a very pronounced disagreement. At
the time of Osiander (d. 1552) there were from fourteen to twenty opinions on the
matter, each differing from every other; but they had this in common that they all
denied the interior holiness and the inherent justification of the Catholic idea of
the process. Among the adherents of the Augsburg Confession the following view
was rather generally accepted: The person to be justified seizes by means of the
fiduciary faith the exterior justice of Christ, and therewith covers his sins; this
exterior justice is imputed to him as if it were his own, and he stands before God
as having an outward justification, but in his inner self he remains the same
sinner as of old. This exterior, forensic declaration of justification was received
with great acclaim by the frenzied, fanatical masses of that time, and was given
wide and vociferous expression in the cry: "Justitia Christi extra nos".
The Catholic idea maintains that the formal cause of justification does not
consist in an exterior imputation of the justice of Christ, but in a real, interior
sanctification effected by grace, which abounds in the soul and makes it
permanently holy before God (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii; can. xi). Although the
sinner is justified by the justice of Christ, inasmuch as the Redeemer has
merited for him the grace of justification (causa meritoria), nevertheless he is
formally justified and made holy by his own personal justice and holiness (causa
formalis), just as a philosopher by his own inherent learning becomes a scholar,
not, however, by any exterior imputation of the wisdom of God (Trent, Sess. VI,
can. x). To this idea of inherent holiness which theologians call sanctifying grace
are we safely conducted by the words of Holy Writ.
To prove this we may remark that the word justificare (Gr. dikaioun) in the Bible
may have a fourfold meaning:
The forensic declaration of justice by a tribunal or court (cf. Is., v, 23;
Prov., xvii, 15).
The interior growth in holiness (Apoc., xxii, 11).
As a substantive, justificatio, the external law (Ps. cxviii, 8, and
elsewhere).
The inner, immanent sanctification of the sinner.
Only this last meaning can be intended where there is mention of passing to a
new life (Eph., ii, 5; Col., ii, 13; I John, iii, 14); renovation in spirit (Eph., iv, 23
sq.); supernatural likeness to God (Rom., viii, 29; II Cor., iii, 18; II Pet., i, 4) a
new creation (II Cor., v, 17; Gal., vi, 15); rebirth in God (John, iii, 5; Tit., iii, 5;
James, i, 18), etc., all of which designations not only imply a setting aside of sin,
but express as well a permanent state of holiness. All of these terms express
not an aid to action, but rather a form of being; and this appears also from the
fact that the grace of justification is described as being "poured forth in our
hearts" (Rom., v, 5); as "the spirit of adoption of sons" of God (Rom., viii, 15); as
the "spirit, born of the spirit" (John, iii, 6); making us "conformable to the image
of the Son" (Rom., viii, 28); as a participation in the Divine nature (II Pet., i, 4);
the abiding seed in us (I John, iii, 9), and so on. As regards the tradition of the
Church, even Harnack admits that St. Augustine faithfully reproduces the
teaching of St. Paul. Hence the Council of Trent need not go back to St. Paul,
but only to St. Augustine, for the purpose of demonstrating that the Protestant
theory of imputation is at once against St. Paul and St. Augustine.
Moreover, this theory must be rejected as not being in accordance with reason.
For in a man who is at once sinful and just, half holy and half unholy, we cannot
possibly recognize a masterpiece of God's omnipotence, but only a wretched
caricature, the deformity of which is exaggerated all the more by the violent
introduction of the justice of Christ. The logical consequences which follow from
this system, and which have been deduced by the Reformers themselves, are
indeed appalling to Catholics. It would follow that, since the justice of Christ is
always and ever the same, every person justified, from the ordinary everyday
person to the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, would possess precisely the
same justification and would have, in degree and kind, the same holiness and
justice. This deduction was expressly made by Luther. Can any man of sound
mind accept it? If this be so, then the justification of children by baptism is
impossible, for, not having come to the age of reason, they cannot have the
fiduciary faith wherewith they must seize the justice of Christ to cover up their
original sin. Very logically, therefore, the Anabaptists, Mennonites, and Baptists
reject the validity of infant baptism. It would likewise follow that the justification
acquired by faith alone could be forfeited only by infidelity, a most awful
consequence which Luther (De Wette, II, 37) clothed in the following words,
though he could hardly have meant them seriously: "Pecca fortiter et crede
fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et mille stupra." Luckily this inexorable
logic falls powerless against the decency and good morals of the Lutherans of
our time, and is, therefore, harmless now, though it was not so at the time of the
Peasants' War in the Reformation.
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vii) defined that the inherent justice is not
only the formal cause of justification, but as well the only formal cause (unica
formalis causa); this was done as against the heretical teaching of the Reformer
Bucer (d. 1551), who held that the inherent justice must be supplemented by the
imputed justice of Christ. A further object of this decree was to check the
Catholic theologian Albert Pighius and others, who seemed to doubt that the
inner justice could be ample for justification without being supplemented by
another favour of God (favor Dei externus) (cf. Pallavacini, Hist. Conc. Trident.,
VIII, 11, 12). This decree was well-founded, for the nature and operation of
justification are determined by the infusion of sanctifying grace. In other words
without the aid of other factors, sanctifying grace in itself possesses the power to
effect the destruction of sin and the interior sanctification of the soul to be
justified. For since sin and grace are diametrically opposed to each other, the
mere advent of grace is sufficient to drive sin away; and thus grace, in its positive
operations, immediately brings about holiness, kinship of God, and a renovation
of spirit, etc. From this it follows that in the present process of justification, the
remission of sin, both original and mortal, is linked to the infusion of sanctifying
grace as a conditio sine qua non, and therefore a remission of sin without a
simultaneous interior sanctification is theologically impossible. As to the
interesting controversy whether the incompatibility of grace and sin rests on
merely moral, or physical, or metaphysical contrariety, refer to Pohle ("Lehrbuch
der Dogmatik", II 511 sqq., Paderborn, 1909); Scheeben ("Die Myst. des
Christentums", 543 sqq., Freiburg, 1898).
II. THE NATURE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE
The real nature of sanctifying grace is, by reason of its direct invisibility, veiled in
mystery, so that we can learn its nature better by a study of its formal operations
in the soul than by a study of the grace itself. Indissolubly linked to the nature of
this grace and to its formal operations are other manifestations of grace which
are referable not to any intrinsic necessity but to the goodness of God;
accordingly three questions present themselves for consideration:
(a) The inner nature of sanctifying grace.
(b) Its formal operations.
(c) Its supernatural retinue.
A. The Inner Nature
1. As we have seen that sanctifying grace designates a grace producing a
permanent condition, it follows that it must not be confounded with a particular
actual grace nor with a series of actual graces, as some ante-Tridentine
theologians seem to have held. This view is confirmed by the fact that the grace
imparted to children in baptism does not differ essentially from the sanctifying
grace imparted to adults, an opinion which was not considered as altogether
certain under Pope Innocent III (1201), was regarded as having a high degree of
probability by Pope Clement V (1311), and was defined as certain by the Council
of Trent (Sess. V, can. iii-v). Baptized infants cannot be justified by the use of
actual grace, but only by a grace which effects or produces a certain condition in
the recipient. Is this grace of condition or state, as Peter Lombard (Sent., I, dist.
xvii, 18) held, identical with the Holy Spirit, whom we may call the permanent,
uncreated grace (gratia increata)? It is quite impossible. For the person of the
Holy Ghost cannot be poured out into our hearts (Rom., v, 5), nor does it cleave
to the soul as inherent justice (Trent, sess. VI, can. xi), nor can it be increased
by good works (loc. cit., can. xxiv), and all this is apart from the fact that the
justifying grace in Holy Writ is expressly termed a "gift [or grace] of the Holy
Ghost" (Acts, ii, 38; x, 45), and as the abiding seed of God (I John, iii, 9). From
this it follows that the grace must be as distinct from the Holy Ghost as the gift
from the giver and the seed from the sower; consequently the Holy Spirit is our
holiness, not by the holiness by which He Himself is holy, but by that holiness
by which He makes us holy. He is not, therefore, the causa formalis, but merely
the causa efficiens, of our holiness.
Moreover, sanctifying grace as an active reality, and not a merely external
relation, must be philosophically either substance or accident. Now, it is
certainty not a substance which exists by itself, or apart from the soul, therefore
it is a physical accident inhering in the soul, so that the soul becomes the
subject in which grace inheres; but such an accident is in metaphysics called
quality (qualitas, poiotes) therefore sanctifying grace may be philosophically
termed a "permanent, supernatural quality of the soul", or, as the Roman
Catechism (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50) says "divina qualitas in anima
inhaerens".
2. Sanctifying grace cannot be termed a habit (habitus) with the same precision
as it is called a quality. Metaphysicians enumerate four kinds of quality:
habit and disposition;
power and want of power;
passion and passible quality, for example, to blush, pale with wrath;
form and figure (cf. Aristotle, Categ. VI).
Manifestly sanctifying grace must be placed in the first of these four classes,
namely habit or disposition; but as dispositions are fleeting things, and habit has
a permanency theologians agree that sanctifying grace is undoubtedly a habit,
hence the name: Habitual Grace (gratia habitualis). Habitus is subdivided into
habitus entitativus and habitus operativus. A habitus entitativus is a quality or
condition added to a substance by which condition or quality the substance is
found permanently good or bad, for instance: sickness or health, beauty,
deformity, etc. Habitus operativus is a disposition to produce certain operations
or acts, for instance, moderation or extravagance; this habitus is called either
virtue or vice just as the soul is inclined thereby to a moral good or to a moral
evil. Now, since sanctifying grace does not of itself impart any such readiness,
celerity, or facility in action, we must consider it primarily as a habitus
entitativus, not as a habitus operativus. Therefore, since the popular concept of
habitus, which usually designates a readiness, does not accurately express the
idea of sanctifying grace, another term is employed, i.e. a quality after the
manner of a habit (qualitas per modum habitus), and this term is applied with
Bellarmine (De grat. et lib. arbit., I, iii). Grace, however, preserves an inner
relation to a supernatural activity, because it does not impart to the soul the act
but rather the disposition to perform supernatural and meritorious acts therefore
grace is remotely and mediately a disposition to act (habitus remote operativus).
On account of this and other metaphysical subtleties the Council of Trent has
refrained from applying the term habitus to sanctifying grace.
In the order of nature a distinction is made between natural and acquired habits
(habitus innatus, and habitus acquisitus), to distinguish between natural
instincts, such, for instance, as are common to the brute creation, and acquired
habits such as we develop by practice, for instance skill in playing a musical
instrument etc. But grace is supernatural, and cannot, therefore, be classed
either as a natural or an acquired habit; it can only be received, accordingly, by
infusion from above, therefore it is a supernatural infused habit (habitus infusus).
3. If theologians could succeed in establishing the identity sometimes
maintained between the nature of grace and charity, a great step forward would
be taken in the examination of the nature of grace, for we are more familiar with
the infused virtue of charity than with the hidden mysterious nature of sanctifying
grace. For the identity of grace and charity some of the older theologians have
contended--Peter Lombard, Scotus, Bellarmine, Lessius, and others--declaring
that, according to the Bible and the teaching of the Fathers, the process of
justification may be at times attributable to sanctifying grace and at other times
to the virtue of charity. Similar effects demand a similar cause; therefore there
exists, in this view, merely a virtual distinction between the two, inasmuch as
one and the same reality appears under one aspect as grace, and under another
as charity. This similarity is confirmed by the further fact that the life or death of
the soul is occasioned respectively by the presence in, or absence from, the soul
of charity. Nevertheless, all these arguments may tend to establish a similarity,
but do not prove a case of identity. Probably the correct view is that which sees a
real distinction between grace and charity, and this view is held by most
theologians, including St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez. Many passages in
Scripture and patrology and in the enactments of synods confirm this view.
Often, indeed, grace and charity are placed side by side, which could not be
done without a pleonasm if they were identical. Lastly, sanctifying grace is a
habitus entitativus, and theological charity a habitus operativus: the former,
namely sanctifying grace, being a habitus entitativus, informs and transforms the
substance of the soul; the latter, namely charity, being a habitus operativus,
supernaturally informs and influences the will (cf. Ripalda, "De ente sup.", disp.
cxxiii; Billuart, "De gratia", disp. iv, 4).
4. The climax of the presentation of the nature of sanctifying grace is found in its
character as a participation in the Divine nature, which in a measure indicates its
specific difference. To this undeniable fact of the supernatural participation in the
Divine nature is our attention directed not only by the express words of Holy Writ:
ut efficiamini divinae consortes naturae (II Pet., i, 4), but also by the Biblical
concept of "the issue and birth from God", since the begotten must receive of the
nature of the progenitor, though in this case it only holds in an accidental and
analogical sense. Since this same idea has been found in the writings of the
Fathers, and is incorporated in the liturgy of the Mass, to dispute or reject it
would be nothing short of temerity. It is difficult to excogitate a manner (modus)
in which this participation of the Divine nature is effected. Two extremes must be
avoided, so that the truth will be found.
An exaggerated theory was taught by certain mystics and quietists, a theory not
free from pantheiotic taint. In this view the soul is formally changed into God, an
altogether untenable and impossible hypothesis, since concupiscence remains
even after justification, and the presence of concupiscence is, of course,
absolutely repugnant to the Divine nature.
Another theory, held by the Scotists, teaches that the participation is merely of a
moral-juridical nature, and not in the least a physical participation. But since
sanctifying grace is a physical accident in the soul, one cannot help referring
such participation in the Divine nature to a physical and interior assimilation with
God, by virtue of which we are permitted to share those goods of the Divine order
to which God alone by His own nature can lay claim. In any event the
"participatio divinae naturae" is not in any sense to be considered a deification,
but only a making of the soul "like unto God". To the difficult question: Of which
special attribute of God does this participation partake? Theologians can answer
only by conjectures. Manifestly only the communicable attributes can at all be
considered in the matter, wherefore Gonet (Clyp. thomist., IV, ii, x) was clearly
wrong when he said that the attribute of participation was the aseitas, absolutely
the most incommunicable of all the Divine attributes. Ripalda (loc. cit., disp. xx;
sect. 14) is probably nearer the truth when he suggests Divine sanctity as the
attribute, for the very idea of sanctifying grace brings the sanctity of God into the
foreground.
The theory of Suarez (De grat., VII, i, xxx), which is also favoured by Scripture
and the Fathers, is perhaps the most plausible. In this theory sanctifying grace
imparts to the soul a participation in the Divine spirituality, which no rational
creature can by its own unaided powers penetrate or comprehend. It is, therefore,
the office of grace to impart to the soul, in a supernatural way, that degree of
spirituality which is absolutely necessary to give us an idea of God and His spirit,
either here below in the shadows of earthly existence, or there above in the
unveiled splendour of Heaven. If we were asked to condense all that we have thus
far been considering into a definition, we would formulate the following:
Sanctifying grace is "a quality strictly supernatural, inherent in the soul as a
habitus, by which we are made to participate in the divine nature".
B. Formal Operations
Sanctifying Grace has its formal operations, which are fundamentally nothing
else than the formal cause considered in its various moments. These operations
are made known by Revelation; therefore to children and to the faithful can the
splendour of grace best be presented by a vivid description of its operations.
These are: sanctity, beauty, friendship, and sonship of God.
1. Sanctity
The sanctity of the soul, as its first formal operation, is contained in the idea
itself of sanctifying grace, inasmuch as the infusion of it makes the subject holy
and inaugurates the state or condition of sanctity. So far it is, as to its nature, a
physical adornment of the soul; it is also a moral form of sanctification, which of
itself makes baptized children just and holy in the sight of God. This first
operation is thrown into relief by the fact that the "new man", created injustice
and holiness (Eph., iv, 24), was preceded by the "old man" of sin, and that grace
changed the sinner into a saint (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii: ex injusto fit justus).
The two moments of actual justification, namely the remission of sin and the
sanctification, are at the same time moments of habitual justification, and
become the formal operations of grace. The mere infusion of the grace effects at
once the remission of original and mortal sin, and inaugurates the condition or
state of holiness. (See Pohle, Lehrb. der Dogm., 527 sq.)
2. Beauty
Although the beauty of the soul is not mentioned by the teaching office of the
Church as one of the operations of grace, nevertheless the Roman Catechism
refers to it (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50). If it be permissible to understand by the
spouse in the Canticle of Canticles a symbol of the soul decked in grace, then all
the passages touching the ravishing beauty of the spouse may find a fitting
application to the soul. Hence it is that the Fathers express the supernatural
beauty of a soul in grace by the most splendid comparisons and figures of
speech, for instance: "a divine picture" (Ambrose); "a golden statue"
(Chrysostom); "a streaming light" (Basil), etc. Assuming that, apart from the
material beauty expressed in the fine arts, there exists a purely spiritual beauty,
we can safely state that grace as the participation in the Divine nature, calls forth
in the soul a physical reflection of the uncreated beauty of God, which is not to
be compared with the soul's natural likeness to God. We can attain to a more
intimate idea of the Divine likeness in the soul adorned with grace, if we refer the
picture not merely to the absolute Divine nature, as the prototype of all beauty,
but more especially to the Trinity whose glorious nature is so charmingly
mirrored in the soul by the Divine adoption and the inhabitation of the Holy Ghost
(cf. H. Krug, De pulchritudine divina, Freiburg, 1902).
3. Friendship
The friendship of God is consequently, one of the most excellent of the effects of
grace; Aristotle denied the possibility of such a friendship by reason of the great
disparity between God and man. As a matter of fact man is, inasmuch as he is
God's creature, His servant, and by reason of sin (original and mortal) he is God's
enemy. This relation of service and enmity is transformed by sanctifying grace
into one of friendship (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii: ex inimico amicus). According to
the Scriptural concept (Wis., vii, 14; John, xv, 15) this friendship resembles a
mystical matrimonial union between the soul and its Divine spouse (Matt., ix, 15;
Apoc., xix, 7). Friendship consists in the mutual love and esteem of two persons
based upon an exchange of service or good office (Aristot., "Eth. Nicom.", VIII
sq.). True friendship resting only on virtue (amicitia honesta) demands undeniably
a love of benevolence, which seeks only the happiness and well-being of the
friend, whereas the friendly exchange of benefits rests upon a utilitarian basis
(amicitia utilis) or one of pleasure (amicitia delectabilis), which presupposes a
selfish love; still the benevolent love of friendship must be mutual, because an
unrequited love becomes merely one of silent admiration, which is not friendship
by any means. But the strong bond of union lies undeniably in the fact of a
mutual benefit, by reason of which friend regards friend as his other self (alter
ego). Finally, between friends an equality of position or station is demanded, and
where this does not exit an elevation of the inferior's status (amicitia excellentie),
as, for example, in the case of a friendship between a king and noble subject. It
is easy to perceive that all these conditions are fulfilled in the friendship between
God and man effected by grace. For, just as God regards the just man with the
pure love of benevolence, He likewise prepares him by the infusion of theological
charity for the reception of a correspondingly pure and unselfish affection. Again,
although man's knowledge of the love of God is very limited, while God's
knowledge of love in man is perfect, this conjecture is sufficient--indeed in human
friendships it alone is possible--to form the basis of a friendly relation. The
exchange of gifts consists, on the part of God, in the bestowal of supernatural
benefits, on the part of man, in the promotion of God's glory, and partly in the
performance of works of fraternal charity. There is, indeed, in the first instance, a
vast difference in the respective positions of God and man; but by the infusion of
grace man receives a patent of nobility, and thus a friendship of excellency
(amicitia excellentiae) is established between God and the just. (See Schiffini,
"De gratia divina", 305 sqq., Freiburg, 1901.)
4. Sonship
In the Divine filiation of the soul the formal workings of sanctifying grace reach
their culminating point; by it man is entitled to a share in the paternal inheritance,
which consists in the beatific vision. This excellence of grace is not only
mentioned countless times in Holy Writ (Rom., viii, 15 sq.; I John, iii, 1 sq., etc.),
but is included in the Scriptural idea of a re-birth in God (cf. John, i, 12 sq.; iii, 5;
Titus, iii, 5; James, i, 18, etc.). Since the re-birth in God is not effected by a
substantial issuance from the substance of God, as in the case of the Son of
God or Logos (Christus), but is merely an analogical or accidental coming forth
from God, our sonship of God is only of an adoptive kind, as we find it expressed
in Scripture (Rom., viii, 15; Gal., iv, 5). This adoption was defined by St. Thomas
(III:23:1): personae extraneae in filium et heredem gratuita assumptio. To the
nature of this adoption there are four requisites;
the original unrelatedness of the adopted person;
fatherly love on the part of the adopting parent for the person adopted;
the absolute gratuity of the choice to sonship and heirship;
the consent of the adopted child to the act of adoption.
Applying these conditions to the adoption of man by God, we find that God's
adoption exceeds man's in every point, for the sinner is not merely a stranger to
God but is as one who has cast off His friendship and become an enemy. In the
case of human adoption the mutual love is presumed as existing, in the case of
God's adoption the love of God effects the requisite deposition in the soul to be
adopted. The great and unfathomable love of God at once bestows the adoption
and the consequent heirship to the kingdom of heaven, and the value of this
inheritance is not diminished by the number of coheirs, as in the case of worldly
inheritance.
God does not impose His favours upon any one, therefore a consent is expected
from adult adopted sons of God (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii, per voluntariam
susceptionem gratiae et donorum). It is quite in keeping with the excellence of
the heavenly Father that He should supply for His children during the pilgrimage a
fitting sustenance which will sustain the dignity of their position, and be to them
a pledge of resurrection and eternal life; and this is the Bread of the Holy
Eucharist (see EUCHARIST).
The Supernatural Retinue
This expression is derived from the Roman Catechism (P. II., c. i, n. 51), which
teaches: "Huic (gratiae sanctificanti) additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum
comitatus". As the concomitants of sanctifying grace, these infused virtues are
not formal operations, but gifts really distinct from this grace, connected
nevertheless with it by a physical, or rather a moral, indissoluble
link--relationship. Therefore the Council of Vienne (1311) speaks of informans
gratia et virtutes, and the Council of Trent, in a more general way, of gratia et
dona. The three theological virtues, the moral virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul are all
considered. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. vii) teaches that the theological
virtues of faith, hope, and charity are in the process of justification infused into
the soul as supernatural habits. Concerning the time of infusion, it is an article of
faith (Sess. VI, can. xi) that the virtue of charity is infused immediately with
sanctifying grace, so that throughout the whole term of existence sanctifying
grace and charity are found as inseparable companions. Concerning the habitus
of faith and hope, Suarez is of the opinion (as against St. Thomas and St.
Bonaventure) that, assuming a favourable disposition in the recipient, they are
infused earlier in the process of justification. Universally known is the expression
of St. Paul (I Cor., xiii, 13), "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these
three: but the greatest of these is charity." Since, here, faith and hope are placed
on a par with charity, but charity is considered as diffused in the soul (Rom., v,
5), conveying thus the idea of an infused habit, it will be seen that the doctrine of
the Church so consonant with the teaching of the Fathers is also supported by
Scripture. The theological virtues have God directly as their formal object, but the
moral virtues are directed in their exercise to created things in their moral
relations. All the special moral virtues can be reduced to the four cardinal virtues:
prudence (prudentia), justice (justitia), fortitude (fortitudo), temperance
(temperantia). The Church favours the opinion that along with grace and charity
the four cardinal virtues (and, according to many theologians, their subsidiary
virtues also) are communicated to the souls of the just as supernatural habitus,
whose office it is to give to the intellect and the will, in their moral relations with
created things, a supernatural direction and inclination. By reason of the
opposition of the Scotists this view enjoys only a degree of probability, which,
however, is supported by passages in Scripture (Prov., viii, 7; Ezech., xi, 19; II
Pet., i, 3 sqq.) as well as the teaching of the Fathers (Augustine, Gregory the
Great, and others). Some theologians add to the infusion of the theological and
moral virtues also that of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though this view
cannot be called anything more than a mere opinion. There are difficulties in the
way of the acceptance of this opinion which cannot be here discussed.
The article of faith goes only to this extent, that Christ as man possessed the
seven gifts (cf. Is., xi, 1 sqq.; lxi, l; Luke, iv, 18). Remembering, however, that St.
Paul (Rom., viii, 9 sqq.) considers Christ, as man, the mystical head of mankind,
and the August exemplar of our own justification, we may possibly assume that
God gives in the process of justification also the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
The crowning point of justification is found in the personal indwelling of the Holy
Spirit. It is the perfection and the supreme adornment of the justified soul.
Adequately considered, the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit consists of a
twofold grace, the created accidental grace (gratia creata accidentalis) and the
uncreated substantial grace (gratia increata substantialis). The former is the
basis and the indispensable assumption for the latter; for where God Himself
erects His throne, there must be found a fitting and becoming adornment. The
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul must not be confounded with God's
presence in all created things, by virtue of the Divine attribute of Omnipresence.
The personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul rests so securely upon the
teaching of Holy Writ and of the Fathers that to deny it would constitute a grave
error. In fact, St. Paul (Rom., v, 5) says: "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us". In this passage the Apostle
distinguishes clearly between the accidental grace of theological charity and the
Person of the Giver. From this it follows that the Holy Spirit has been given to us,
and dwells within us (Rom.,viii, 11), so that we really become temples of the Holy
Ghost (I Cor., iii, 16 sq.; vi, 19). Among all the Fathers of the Church (excepting,
perhaps, St. Augustine) it is the Greeks who are more especially noteworthy for
their rapturous uttertances touching the infusion of the Holy Ghost. Note the
expressions: "The replenishing of the soul with balsamic odours", "a glow
permeating the soul", "a gilding and refining of the soul". Against the
Pneumatomachians they strive to prove the real Divinity of the Holy Spirit from
His indwelling, maintaining that only God can establish Himself in the soul;
surely no creature can inhabit any other creatures. But clear and undeniable as
the fact of the indwelling is, equally difficult and perplexing is it in degree to
explain the method and manner (modus) of this indwelling.
Theologians offer two explanations. The greater number hold that the indweling
must not be considered a substantial information, nor a hypostatic union, but
that it really means an indwelling of the Trinity (John, xiv, 23), but is more
specifically appropriated to the Holy Ghost by reason of His notional character as
the Hypostatic Holiness and Personal Love.
Another small group of theologians (Petavius, Scheeben, Hurter, etc.), basing
their opinion upon the teaching of the Fathers, especially the Greek, distinguish
between the inhabitatio totius Trinitatis, and the inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, and
decide that this latter must be regarded as a union (unio, enosis) pertaining to
the Holy Ghost alone, from which the other two Persons are excluded. It would
be difficult, if not impossible to reconcile this theory, in spite of its deep mystical
significance, with the recognized principles of the doctrine of the Trinity, namely
the law of appropriation and Divine mission. Hence this theory is almost
universally rejected (see Franzelin, "De Deo trino", thes. xliii-xlviii, Rome, 1881).
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE
The Protestant conception of justification boasts of three characteristics:
absolute certainty (certitudo), complete uniformity in all the justified (aequalitas),
unforfeitableness (inamissibilitas). According to the teaching of the Church,
sanctifying grace has the opposite characteristics: uncertainty (incertitudo),
inequality (inaequalitas), and amissibility (amissibilitas).
A. Uncertainty
The heretical doctrine of the Reformers, that man by a fiduciary faith knows with
absolute certainty that he is justified, received the attention of the Council of
Trent (Sess. VI, cap. ix), in one entire chapter (De inani fiducia haereticorum),
three canons (loc. cit., can. xiii-xv) condemning the necessity, the alleged power,
and the function of fiduciary faith. The object of the Church in defining the dogma
was not to shatter the trust in God (certitudo spei) in the matter of personal
salvation, but to repel the misleading assumptions of an unwarranted certainty of
salvation (certitudo fidei). In doing this the Church is altogether obedient to the
instruction of Holy Writ, for, since Scripture declares that we must work out our
salvation "with fear and trembling" (Phil., ii, 12), it is impossible to regard our
individual salvation as something fixed antd certain. Why did St. Paul (I Cor., ix,
27) chastise his body if not afraid lest, having preached to others, he might
himself "become a castaway"? He says expressly (I Cor., iv, 4): "For I am not
conscious to myself of any thing, yet am I not hereby justified; but he that
judgeth me, is the Lord." Tradition also rejects the Lutheran idea of certainty of
justification. Pope Gregory the Great (lib. VII, ep. xxv) was asked by a pious lady
of the court, named Gregoria, to say what was the state of her soul. He replied
that she was putting to him a difficult and useless question, which he could not
answer, because God had not vouchsafed to him any revelation concerning the
state of her soul, and only after her death could she have any certain knowledge
as to the forgiveness of her sins. No one can be absolutely certain of his or her
salvation unless--as to Magdalen, to the man with the palsy, or to the penitent
thief--a special revelation be given (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xvi). Nor can a
theological certainty, any more than an absolute certainty of belief, be claimed
regarding the matter of salvation, for the spirit of the Gospel is strongly opposed
to anything like an unwarranted certainty of salvation. Therefore the rather hostile
attitude to the Gospel spirit advanced by Ambrosius Catherinus (d. 1553), in his
little work: "De certitudine gratiae", received such general opposition from other
theologians. Since no metaphysical certainty can be cherished in the matter of
justification in any particular case, we must content ourselves with a moral
certainty, which, of course, is but warranted in the case of baptized children, and
which, in the case of adults diminishes more or less, just as all the conditions of,
salvation are complied with--not an easy matter to determine. Nevertheless any
excessive anxiety and disturbance may be allayed (Rom., viii, 16, 38 sq.) by the
subjective conviction that we are probably in the state of grace.
B. Inequality
If man, as the Protestant theory of justification teaches, is justified by faith alone,
by the external justice of Christ, or God, the conclusion which Martin Luther
(Sermo de nat. Maria) drew must follow, namely that "we are all equal to Mary
the Mother of God and just as holy as she". But if on the other hand, according
to the teaching of the Church, we are justifed by the justice and merits of Christ
in such fashion that this becomes formally our own justice and holiness, then
there must result an inequality of grace in individuals, and for two reasons: first,
because according to the generosity of God or the receptive condition of the soul
an unequal amount of grace is infused; then, also, because the grace originally
received can be increased by the performance of good works (Trent, Sess. VI,
cap. vii, can. xxiv). This possibility of increase in grace by good works, whence
would follow its inequality in individuals, find its warrant in those Scriptural texts
in which an increase of grace is either expressed or implied (Prov., iv, 18;
Ecclus., xviii, 22; II Cor., ix, 10; Eph., iv, 7; II Pet., iii, 18; Apoc., xxii, 11).
Tradition had occasion, as early as the close of the fourth century, to defend the
old Faith of the Church against the heretic Jovinian, who strove to introduce into
the Church the Stoic doctrine of the equality of all virtue and all vice. St. Jerome
(Con. Jovin., II, xxiii) was the chief defender of orthodoxy in this instance. The
Church never recognized any other teaching than that laid down by St. Augustine
(Tract. in Jo., vi, 8): "Ipsi sancti in ecclesia sunt alii aliis sanctiores, alii aliis
meliores." Indeed, this view should commend itself to every thinking man.
The increase of grace is by theologians justly called a second justification
(justificatio secunda), as distinct from the first justification (justificatio prima),
which is coupled with a remission of sin; for, though there be in the second
justification no transit from sin to grace, there is an advance from grace to a more
perfect sharing therein. If inquiry be made as to the mode of this increase, it can
only be explained by the philosophical maxim: "Qualities are susceptible of
increase and decrease"; for instance, light and heat by the varying degree of
intensity increase or diminish. The question is not a theological but a
philosophical one to decide whether the increase be effected by an addition of
grade to grade (additio gradus ad gradum), as most theologians believe; or
whether it be by a deeper and firmer taking of root in the soul (major radicatio in
subjecto), as many Thomists claim. This question has a special connection with
that concerning the multiplication of the habitual act.
But the last question that arises has decidedly a theological phase, namely, can
the infusion of sanctifying grace be increased infinitely? Or is there a limit, a
point at which it must be arrested? To maintain that the increase can go on to
infinity, i.e. that man by successive advances in holiness can finally enter into
the possession of an infinite endowment involves a manifest contradiction, for
such a grade is as impossible as an infinite temperature in physics.
Theoretically, therefore, we can consider only an increase without any real limit
(in indefinitum). Practically however, two ideals of unattained and unattainable
holiness have been determined, which nevertheless, are finite. The one is the
inconceivably great holiness of the human soul of Christ, the other the fullness of
grace which dwelt in the soul of the Virgin Mary.
C. Amissibility
In consonance with his doctrine of justification by faith alone, Luther made the
loss or forfeiture of justification depend solely upon infidelity, while Calvin
maintained that the predestined could not possibly lose their justification; as to
those not predestined, he said, God merely aroused in them a deceitful show of
faith and justification. On account of the grave moral dangers which lurked in the
assertion that outside of unbelief there can be no serious sin destructive of Divine
grace in the soul, the Council of Trent was obliged to condemn (Sess. VI, can.
xxiii, xxvii) both these views. The lax principles of "evangelical liberty", the
favourite catchword of the budding Reformation, were simply repudiated (Trent
Sess. VI, can. xix-xxi). But the synod (Sess. VI cap. xi) added that not venial but
only mortal sin involved the loss of grace. In this declaration there was a perfect
accord with Scripture and Tradition. Even in the Old Testament the prophet
Ezechiel (Ezech., xviii, 24) says of the godless: "All his justices which he hath
done, shall not be remembered: in the prevarication, by which he hath
prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he shall die." Not
in vain does St. Paul (I Cor., x, 12) warn the just: "Wherefore he that thinketh
himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall"; and state uncompromisingly:
"The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God...neither fornicators, nor
idolaters, nor adulterers.... nor covetous, nor drunkards...shall possess the
kingdom of God" (I Cor., vi, 9 sq.). Hence it is not by infidelity alone that the
Kingdom of Heaven will be lost. Tradition shows that the discipline of confessors
in the early Church proclaims the belief that grace and justification are lost by
mortal sin. The principle of justification by faith alone is unknown to the Fathers.
The fact that mortal sin takes the soul out of the state of grace is due to the very
nature of mortal sin. Mortal sin is an absolute turning away from God, the
supernatural end of the soul, and is an absolute turning to creatures; therefore,
habitual mortal sin cannot exist with habitual grace any more than fire and water
can co-exist in the same subject. But as venial sin does not constitute such an
open rupture with God, and does not destroy the friendship of God, therefore
venial sin does not expel sanctifying grace from the soul. Hence, St. Augustine
says (De spir. et lit., xxviii, 48): "Non impediunt a vita Aeterna justum quaedam
peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur."
But does venial sin, without extinguishing grace, nevertheless diminish it, just as
good works give an increase of grace? Denys the Carthusian (d. 1471) was of the
opinion that it does, though St. Thomas rejects it (II-II:24:10). A gradual decrease
of grace would only be possible on the supposition that either a definite number
of venial sins amounted to a mortal sin, or that the supply of grace might be
diminished, grade by grade, down to ultimate extinction. The first hypothesis is
contrary to the nature of venial sin; the second leads to the heretical view that
grace may be lost without the commission of mortal sin. Nevertheless, venial
sins have an indirect influence on the state of grace, for they make a relapse into
mortal sin easy (cf. Ecclus., xix, 1). Does the loss of sanctifying grace bring with
it the forfeiture of the supernatural retinue of infused virtues? Since the theological
virtue of charity, though not identical, nevertheless is inseparably connected with
grace, it is clear that both must stand or fall together, hence the expressions "to
fall from grace" and "to lose charity" are equivalent. It is an article of faith (Trent,
Sess. VI, can. xxviii, cap. xv) that theological faith may survive the Commission
of mortal sin, and can be extinguished only by its diametrical opposite, namely,
infidelity. It may be regarded as a matter of Church teaching that theological
hope also survives mortal sin, unless this hope should be utterly killed by its
extreme opposite, namely despair, though probably it is not destroyed by it
second opposite, presumption. With regard to the moral virtues, the seven gifts
and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, which invariably accompany grace and
charity, it is clear that when mortal sin enters into the soul they cease to exist
(cf. Suarez, "De gratia", IX, 3 sqq.). As to the fruits of sanctifying grace, see
MERIT.
J. Pohle
Transcribed by Scott Anthony Hibbs & Wendy Lorraine Hoffman
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VI
Copyright © 1909 by Robert Appleton Company
Online Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
Nihil Obstat, September 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor
Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York
The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org