Merit

By merit (meritum) in general is understood that property of a good work which

entitles the doer to receive a reward (prœmium, merces) from him in whose

service the work is done. By antonomasia, the word has come to designate also

the good work itself, in so far as it deserves a reward from the person in whose

service it was performed.

In the theological sense, a supernatural merit can only be a salutary act (actus

salutaris), to which God in consequence of his infallible promise owes a

supernatural reward, consisting ultimately in eternal life, which is the beatific

vision in heaven. As the main purpose of this article is to vindicate the Catholic

doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, the subject is treated under the

four following heads:

I. Nature of Merit;

II. Existence of Merit;

III. Conditions of Merit, and

IV. Objects of Merit.

I. NATURE OF MERIT

(a) If we analyse the definition given above, it becomes evident that the property

of merit can be found only in works that are positively good, whilst bad works,

whether they benefit or injure a third party, contain nothing but demerit

(demeritum) and consequently deserve punishment. Thus the good workman

certainly deserves the reward of his labour, and the thief deserves the

punishment of his crime. From this it naturally follows that merit and reward,

demerit and punishment, bear to each other the relation of deed and return; they

are correlative terms of which one postulates the other. Reward is due to merit,

and the reward is in proportion to the merit. This leads to the third condition, viz.,

that merit supposes two distinct persons, the one who acquires the merit and the

other who rewards it; for the idea of self-reward is just as contradictory as that of

self-punishment. Lastly, the relation between merit and reward furnishes the

intrinsic reason why in the matter of service and its remuneration the guiding

norm can be only the virtue of justice, and not disinterested kindness or pure

mercy; for it would destroy the very notion of reward to conceive of it as a free gift

of bounty (cf. Rom., xi, 6). If, however, salutary acts can in virtue of the Divine

justice give the right to an eternal reward, this is possible only because they

themselves have their root in gratuitous grace, and consequently are of their very

nature dependent ultimately on grace, as the Council of Trent emphatically

declares (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, 10th ed., Freiburg, 1908, n. 810): "the

Lord . . . whose bounty towards all men is so great, that He will have the things,

which are His own gifts, be their merits."

Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:

Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum

adœquatum sive de condigno), and

congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).

Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured

by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a

reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic

proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the

ground of equity. This early-scholastic distinction and terminology, which is

already recognized in concept and substance by the Fathers of the Church in

their controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, were again

emphasized by Johann Eck, the famous adversary of Martin Luther (cf. Greying,

"Joh. Eck als junger Gelehrter," Münster, 1906, pp. 153 sqq.). The essential

difference between meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo is based on

the fact that, besides those works which claim a remuneration under pain of

violating strict justice (as in contracts between employer and employee, in

buying and selling, etc.), there are also other meritorious works which at most

are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity (ex œquitate) or mere

distributive justice (ex iustitia distributiva), as in the case of gratuities and

military decorations. From an ethical point of view the difference practically

amounts to this that, if the reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a

violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make

restitution, while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves

no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence

against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (acceptio

personarum). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great

measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply

on his good will.

In applying these notions of merit to man's relation to God it is especially

necessary to keep in mind the fundamental truth that the virtue of justice cannot

be brought forward as the basis of a real title for a Divine reward either in the

natural or in the supernatural order. The simple reason is that God, being

self-existent, absolutely independent, and sovereign, can be in no respect bound

in justice with regard to his creatures. Properly speaking, man possesses

nothing of his own; all that he has and all that he does is a gift of God, and, since

God is infinitely self-sufficient, there is no advantage or benefit which man can by

his services confer upon Him. Hence on the part of God there can only be

question of a gratuitous promise of reward for certain good works. For such

works He owes the promised reward, not in justice or equity, but solely because

He has freely bound himself, i.e., because of His own attributes of veracity and

fidelity. It is on this ground alone that we can speak of Divine justice at all, and

apply the principle: Do ut des (cf. St. Augustine, Serm. clviii, c. ii, in P. L.,

XXXVIII, 863).

(b) There remains the distinction between merit and satisfaction; for a meritorious

work is not identical, either in concept or in fact, with a satisfactory work. In the

language of theology, satisfaction means:

atoning by some suitable service for an injury done to another's honour or

for any other offence, in somewhat the same fashion as in modern duelling

outraged honour is satisfied by recourse to swords or pistols;

paying off the temporal punishment due to sin by salutary penitential

works voluntarily undertaken after one's sins have been forgiven. Sin, as

an offence against God, demands satisfaction in the first sense; the

temporal punishment due to sin calls for satisfaction in the second sense

(see PENANCE).

Christian faith teaches us that the Incarnate Son of God by His death on the

cross has in our stead fully satisfied God's anger at our sins, and thereby

effected a reconciliation between the world and its Creator. Not, however, as

though nothing were now left to be done by man, or as though he were now

restored to the state of original innocence, whether he wills it or not; on the

contrary, God and Christ demand of him that he make the fruits of the Sacrifice

of the Cross his own by personal exertion and co-operation with grace, by

justifying faith and the reception of baptism. It is a defined article of the Catholic

Faith that man before, in, and after justification derives his whole capability of

meriting and satisfying, as well as his actual merits and satisfactions, solely

from the infinite treasure of merits which Christ gained for us on the Cross (cf.

Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. xvi; Sess. XIV, cap. viii).

The second kind of satisfaction, that namely by which temporal punishment is

removed, consists in this, that the penitent after his justification gradually

cancels the temporal punishments due to his sins, either ex opere operato, by

conscientiously performing the penance imposed on him by his confessor, or ex

opere operantis, by self-imposed penances (such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving,

etc.) and by bearing patiently the sufferings and trials sent by God; if he neglects

this, he will have to give full satisfaction (satispassio) in the pains of purgatory

(cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XIV, can. xiii, in Denzinger, n. 923). Now, if the

concept of satisfaction in its twofold meaning be compared with that of merit as

developed above, the first general conclusion will be that merit constitutes a

debtor who owes a reward, whilst satisfaction supposes a creditor whose

demands must be met. In Christ's work of redemption merit and satisfaction

materially coincide almost to their full extent, since as a matter of fact the merits

of Christ are also works of satisfaction for man. But, since by His Passion and

Death He truly merited, not only graces for us, but also external glory for His own

Person (His glorious Resurrection and Ascension, His sitting at the right hand of

the Father, the glorification of His name of Jesus, etc.), it follows that His

personal merit extends further than His satisfaction, as He had no need of

satisfying for Himself. The substantial and conceptual distinction between merit

and satisfaction holds good when applied to the justified Christian, for every

meritorious act has for its main object the increase of grace and of eternal glory,

while satisfactory works have for their object the removal of the temporal

punishment still due to sin. In practice and generally speaking, however, merit

and satisfaction are found in every salutary act, so that every meritorious work is

also satisfactory and vice versa. It is indeed also essential to the concept of a

satisfactory work of penance that it be penal and difficult, which qualities are not

connoted by the concept of merit; but since, in the present state of fallen nature,

there neither is nor can be a meritorious work which in one way or another has

not connected with it difficulties and hardships, theologians unanimously teach

that all our meritorious works without exception bear a penal character and

thereby may become automatically works of satisfaction. Against how many

difficulties and distractions have we not to contend even during our prayers,

which by right should be the easiest of all good works! Thus, prayer also

becomes a penance, and hence confessors may in most cases content

themselves with imposing prayer as a penance. (Cf. De Lugo, "De pœnitentia,"

disp. xxiv, sect. 3.)

(c) Owing to the peculiar relation between and material identity of merit and

satisfaction in the present economy of salvation, a twofold value must in general

be distinguished in every good work: the meritorious and the satisfactory value.

But each preserves its distinctive character, theoretically by the difference in

concepts, and practically in this, that the value of merit as such, consisting in

the increase of grace and of heavenly glory, is purely personal and is not

applicable to others, while the satisfactory value may be detached from the

meriting agent and applied to others. The possibility of this transfer rests on the

fact that the residual punishments for sin are in the nature of a debt, which may

be legitimately paid to the creditor and thereby cancelled not only by the debtor

himself but also by a friend of the debtor. This consideration is important for the

proper understanding of the usefulness of suffrages for the souls in purgatory (cf.

Council of Trent, Sess. XXV, Decret. de purgat., in Denzinger, n. 983). When one

wishes to aid the suffering souls, one cannot apply to them the purely

meritorious quality of his work, because the increase of grace and glory accrues

only to the agent who merits. But it has pleased the Divine wisdom and mercy to

accept the satisfactory quality of one's work under certain circumstances as an

equivalent of the temporal punishment still to be endured by the faithful departed,

just as if the latter had themselves performed the work. This is one of the most

beautiful and consoling aspects of that grand social organization which we call

the "Communion of Saints" (q. v.), and moreover affords us an insight into the

nature of the "heroic act of charity" approved by Pius IX, whereby the faithful on

earth, out of heroic charity for the souls in Purgatory, voluntarily renounce in their

favour the satisfactory fruits of all their good works, even all the suffrages which

shall be offered for them after their death, in order that they may thus benefit and

assist the souls in purgatory more quickly and more efficaciously.

The efficacy of the prayer of the just be it for the living or for the dead, calls for

special consideration. In the first place it is evident that prayer as a pre-eminently

good work has in common with other similar good works, such as fasting and

almsgiving, the twofold value of merit and satisfaction. Because of its satisfactory

character, prayer will also obtain for the souls in purgatory by way of suffrage (per

modum suffragii) either a diminution or a total cancelling of the penalty that

remains to be paid. Prayer has, moreover, the characteristic effect of impetration

(effectus impetratorius), for he who prays appeals solely to the goodness, love,

and liberality of God for the fulfilment of his desires, without throwing the weight

of his own merits into the scale. He who prays fervently and unceasingly gains a

hearing with God because he prays, even should he pray with empty hands (cf.

John, xiv 13 sq.; xvi, 23). Thus the special efficacy of prayer for the dead is easily

explained, since it combines efficacy of satisfaction and impetration, and this

twofold efficacy is enhanced by the personal worthiness of the one who, as a

friend of God, offers the prayer. Since the meritoriousness of good works

supposes the state of justification, or, what amounts to the same, the

possession of sanctifying grace, supernatural merit is only an effect or fruit of the

state of grace (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. xvi). Hence, it is plain that this

whole article is really only a continuation and a completion of the doctrine of

sanctifying grace (see GRACE).

II. THE EXISTENCE OF MERIT

(a) According to Luther justification consists essentially in the mere covering of

man's sins, which remain in the soul, and in the external imputation of Christ's

justice; hence his assertion that even "the just sin in every good work" (see

Denzinger, n. 771), as also that "every work of the just is worthy of damnation

[damnabile] and a mortal sin [peccatum mortale], if it be considered as it really

is in the judgment of God" (see Möhler, "Symbolik", 22). According to the

doctrine of Calvin (Instit., III, ii, 4) good works are "impurities and defilement"

(inquinamenta et sordes), but God covers their innate hideousness with the cloak

of the merits of Christ, and imputes them to the predestined as good works in

order that He may requite them not with life eternal, but at most with a temporal

reward. In consequence of Luther's proclamation of "evangelical liberty", John

Agricola (died 1566) asserted that in the New Testament it was not allowed to

preach the "Law", and Nicholas Amsdorf (died 1565) maintained that good works

were positively harmful. Such exaggerations gave rise in 1527 to the fierce

Antinomian controversy, which, after various efforts on Luther's part, was finally

settled in 1540 by the recantation forced from Agricola by Joachim II of

Brandenburg. Although the doctrine of modem Protestantism continues obscure

and indefinite, it teaches generally speaking that good works are a spontaneous

consequence of justifying faith, without being of any avail for life eternal. Apart

from earlier dogmatic declarations given in the Second Synod of Orange of 529

and in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (see Denzinger, 191, 430), the Council

of Trent upheld the traditional doctrine of merit by insisting that life everlasting is

both a grace and a reward (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, n. 809). It

condemned as heretical Luther's doctrine of the sinfulness of good works (Sess.

VI, can. xxv), and declared as a dogma that the just, in return for their good

works done in God through the merits of Jesus Christ, should expect an eternal

reward (loc. cit., can. xxvi).

This doctrine of the Church simply echoes Scripture and Tradition. The Old

Testament already declares the meritoriousness of good works before God. "But

the just shall live for evermore: and their reward is with the Lord" (Wis., v, 16).

"Be not afraid to be justified even to death: for the reward of God continueth for

ever" (Ecclus., xviii, 22). Christ Himself adds a special reward to each of the

Eight Beatitudes and he ends with this fundamental thought: "Be glad and

rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven" (Matt. v, 12) In His description of

the Last Judgment, He makes the possession of eternal bliss depend on the

practice of the corporal works of mercy (Matt. xxv, 34 sqq.). Although St. Paul

insists on nothing more strongly than the absolute gratuitousness of Christian

grace, still he acknowledges merits founded on grace and also the reward due to

them on the part of God, which he variously calls "prize" (Phil., iii, 14; I Cor., ix

24) "reward" (Col., iii, 24; I Cor., iii, 8), "crown of justice" (II Tim., iv, 7 sq.; cf.

James, i, 12). It is worthy of note that, in these and many others good works are

not represented as mere adjuncts of justifying faith, but as real fruits of

justification and part causes of our eternal happiness. And the greater the merit,

the greater will be the reward in heaven (cf. Matt., xvi, 27; I Cor., iii, 8; II Cor., ix,

6). Thus the Bible itself refutes the assertion that "the idea of merit is originally

foreign to the Gospel" (" Realencyklopädie für protest. Theologie," XX, 3rd ed.

Leipzig, 1908, p. 501). That Christian grace can be merited either by the

observance of the Jewish law or by mere natural works (see GRACE) this alone

is foreign to the Bible. On the other hand, eternal reward is promised in the Bible

to those supernatural works which are performed in the state of grace, and that

because they are meritorious (cf. Matt., xxv, 34 sqq.; Rom., ii, 6 sqq.; II Cor., v,

10).

Even Protestants concede that, in the oldest literature of the Apostolic Fathers

and Christian Apologists, "the idea of merit was read into the Gospel," and that

Tertullian by defending "merit in the strict sense gave the key-note to Western

Catholicism" (Realencykl., pp. 501, 502). He was followed by St. Cyprian with

the declaration: "You can attain to the vision of God, if you deserve it by your life

and works" ("De op. et elemos.", xiv, ed. Hartel, I, 384). With St. Ambrose (De

offic., I, xv, 57) and St. Augustine (De morib. eccl., I, xxv), the other Fathers of

the Church took the Catholic doctrine on merit as a guide in their teaching,

especially in their homilies to the faithful, so that uninterrupted agreement is

secured between Bible and Tradition, between patristic and scholastic teaching,

between the past and the present. If therefore "the reformation was mainly a

struggle against the doctrine of merit" (Realencyklopädie, loc. cit., p. 506) this

only proves that the Council of Trent defended against unjustified innovations the

old doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, founded alike on Scripture and

Tradition.

(b) This doctrine of the Church, moreover, fully accords with natural ethics. Divine

Providence, as the supreme lawgiver, owes it to itself to give efficacious sanction

to both the natural and the supernatural law with their many commandments and

prohibitions, and to secure their observance by holding out rewards and

punishments. Even human laws are provided with sanctions, which are often very

severe. He who denies the meritoriousness of good works performed by the just

must necessarily also deny the culpability and demerit of the sinner's misdeeds;

must hold that sins remain without punishment, and that the fear of hell is both

groundless and useless. If there be no eternal reward for an upright life and no

eternal chastisement for sin, it will matter little to the majority of people whether

they lead a good or a bad life. It is true that, even if there were neither reward nor

punishment, it would be contrary to rational nature to lead an immoral life; for the

moral obligation to do always what is right, does not of itself depend on

retribution. But Kant undoubtedly went too far when he repudiated as immoral

those actions which are performed with a view to our personal happiness or to

that of others, and proclaimed the "categorical imperative," i. e., frigid duty

clearly perceived, as the only motive of moral conduct. For, though this so-called

"autonomy of the moral will" may at first sight appear highly ideal, still it is

unnatural and cannot be carried out in practical life, because virtue and

happiness, duty and merit (with the claim to reward), are not mutually exclusive,

but, as correlatives, they rather condition and complete each other. The peace of

a good conscience that follows the faithful performance of duty is an unsought-for

reward of our action and an interior happiness of which no calamity can deprive

us, so that, as a matter of fact, duty and happiness are always linked together.

(c) But is not this continual acting "with one eye on heaven", with which

Professor Jodl reproaches Catholic moral teaching, the meanest "mercenary

spirit" and greed which necessarily vitiates to the core all moral action? Can

there be any question of morality, if it is only the desire for eternal bliss or simply

the fear of hell that determines one to do good and avoid evil? Such a disposition

is certainly far from being the ideal of Catholic morality. On the Contrary, the

Church proclaims to all her children that pure love of God is the first and supreme

commandment (cf. Mark, xii, 30). It is our highest ideal to act out of love. For he

who truly loves God would keep His commandments, even though there were no

eternal reward in the next life. Nevertheless, the desire for heaven is a necessary

and natural consequence of the perfect love of God; for heaven is only the perfect

possession of God by love. As a true friend desires to see his friend without

thereby sinking into egotism so does the loving soul ardently desire the Beatific

Vision, not from a craving for reward, but out of pure love. It is unfortunately too

true that only the best type of Christians, and especially the great saints of the

Church, reach this high standard of morality in everyday life. The great majority of

ordinary Christians must be deterred from sin principally by the fear of hell and

spurred on to good works by the thought of an eternal reward, before they attain

perfect love. But, even for those souls who love God, there are times of grave

temptation when only the thought of heaven and hell keeps them from falling.

Such a disposition, be it habitual or only transitory, is morally less perfect, but it

is not immoral. As, according to Christ's doctrine and that of St. Paul (see

above), it is legitimate to hope for a heavenly reward, so, according to the same

doctrine of Christ (cf. Matt., x, 28), the fear of hell is a motive of moral action, a

"grace of God and an impulse of the Holy Ghost" (Council of Trent, Sess. XIV,

cap. iv, in Denzinger, n. 898). Only that desire for remuneration (amor

mercenarius) is reprehensible which would content itself with an eternal

happiness without God, and that "doubly servile fear" (timor serviliter servilis) is

alone immoral which proceeds from a mere dread of punishment without at the

same time fearing God. But the dogmatic as well as the moral teaching of the

Church avoids both of these extremes (see ATTRITION).

Besides blaming the Church for fostering a "craving for reward," Protestants also

accuse her of teaching "justification by works". External works alone, they

allege, such as fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimages, the recitation of the rosary etc.,

make the Catholic good and holy, the intenor intention and disposition being held

to no account. "The whole doctrine of merit, especially as explained by Catholics

is based on the erroneous view which places the essence of morality in the

individual action without any regard for the interior disposition as the habitual

direction of the personal will" (Realencyklopädie, loc. cit., p. 508). Only the

grossest ignorance of Catholic doctrine can prompt such remarks. In accord with

the Bible the Church teaches that the external work has a moral value only when

and in so far as it proceeds from a right interior disposition and intention (cf.

Matt., vi, 1 sqq.; Mark, xii, 41 sqq.; I Cor., x, 31, etc.). As the body receives its

life from the soul, so must external actions be penetrated and vivified by holiness

of intention. In a beautiful play on words St. Augustine says (Serm. iii, n. xi):

Bonos mores faciunt boni amores. Hence the Church urges her children to

forming each morning the "good intention", that they may thereby sanctify the

whole day and make even the indifferent actions of their exterior life serve for the

glory of God; "all for the greater glory of God", is the constant prayer of the

faithful Catholic. Not only does the moral teaching of the Catholic Church

attribute no moral value whatever to the mere external performance of good works

without a corresponding good intention, but it detests such performance as

hyprocrisy and pretence. On the other hand, our good Intention, provided it be

genuine and deep-rooted, naturally spurs us on to external works, and without

these works it would be reduced to a mere semblance of life.

A third charge against the Catholic doctrine on merit is summed up in the word

"self-righteousness", as if the just man utterly disregarded the merits of Christ

and arrogated to himself the whole credit of his good works. If any Catholic has

ever been so pharisaical as to hold and practise this doctrine, he has certainly

set himself in direct opposition to what the Church teaches. The Church has

always proclaimed what St. Augustine expresses in the words: "Non Dens

coronat merita tua tanquam merita tua, sed tanquam dona sua" (De grat. et lib.

arbitrio, xv), i. e., God crowns thy merits, not as thine earnings, but as His gifts.

Nothing was more strong and frequently inculcated by the Council of Trent than

the proposition that the faithful owe their entire capability of meriting and all their

good works solely to the infinite merits of the Redeemer Jesus Christ. It is indeed

clear that meritorious works, as "fruits of the justification", cannot be anything

but merits due to grace, and not merits due to nature (cf. Council of Trent, Sess.

VI, cap. xvi). The Catholic certainly must rely on the merits of Christ, and, far

from boasting of his own self-righteousness, he must acknowledge in all humility

that even his merits, acquired with the help of grace, are full of imperfections, and

that his justification is uncertain (see GRACE). Of the satisfactory works of

penance the Council of Trent makes this explicit declaration: "Thus, man has not

wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, move, and

make satisfaction, bringing forth fruits worthy of penance, which from Him have

their efficacy, are by Him offered to the Father, and through Him find with the

Father acceptance" (Sess. XIV, cap. viii, in Denzinger, n. 904). Does this read

like self-righteousness?

III. CONDITIONS OF MERIT

For all true merit (vere mereri; Council of Trent, Sess. VI, can. xxxii), by which is

to be understood only meritum de condigno (see Pallavicini, "Hist. Concil.

Trident.", VIII, iv), theologians have set down seven conditions, of which four

regard the meritorious work, two the agent who merits, and one God who

rewards.

(a) In order to be meritorious a work must be morally good, morally free, done

with the assistance of actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive. As

every evil deed implies demerit and deserves punishment, so the very notion of

merit supposes a morally good work. St. Paul teaches that "whatsoever good

thing [bonum] any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord,

whether he be bond, or free" (Eph. vi, 8). Not only are more perfect works of

supererogation, such as the vow of perpetual chastity, good and meritorious but

also works of obligation, such as the faithful observance of the commandments.

Christ Himself actually made the attainment of heaven depend on the mere

observance of the ten commandments when he answered the youth who was

anxious about his salvation: "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments"

(Matt., xix, 17). According to the authentic declaration of the Fourth Lateran

Council (1215) the married state is also meritorious for heaven: "Not only those

who live in virginity and continence, but also those who are married, please God

by their faith and good works and merit eternal happiness" (cap. Firmiter, in

Denzinger, n. 430). As to morally indifferent actions (e. g., exercise and play,

recreation derived from reading and music), some moralists hold with the

Scotists that such works may be indifferent not only in the abstract but also

practically; this opinion, however is rejected by the majority of theologians. Those

who hold this view must hold that such morally indifferent actions are neither

meritorious nor demeritorious, but become meritorious in proportion as they are

made morally good by means of the "good intention". Although the voluntary

omission of a work of obligation, such as the hearing of Mass on Sundays, is

sinful and thereby demeritorious, still, according to the opinion of Suarez (De

gratia, X, ii, 5 sqq.), it is more than doubtful whether conversely the mere

omission of a bad action is in itself meritorious. But the overcoming of a

temptation would be meritorious, since this struggle is a positive act and not a

mere omission. Since the external work as such derives its entire moral value

from the interior disposition, it adds no increase of merit except in so far as it

reacts on the will and has the effect of intensifying and sustaining its action (cf.

De Lugo, "De pœnit.", disp. xxiv, sect. 6).

As to the second requisite, i. e., moral liberty, it is clear from ethics that actions,

due to external force or internal compulsion, can deserve neither reward nor

punishment. It is an axiom of criminal jurisprudence that no one shall be

punished for a misdeed done without free will; similarly, a good work can only

then be meritorious and deserving of reward when it proceeds from a free

determination of the will. This is the teaching of Christ (Matt., xix, 21): "If thou

wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor, and thou shalt have

treasure in heaven."

The necessity of the third condition, i. e., of the influence of actual grace, is clear

from the fact that every act meriting heaven must evidently be supernatural just

as heaven itself is supernatural, and that consequently it cannot be performed

without the help of prevenient and assisting grace, which is necessary even for

the just. The strictly supernatural destiny of the Beatific Vision, for which the

Christian must strive, necessitates ways and means which lie altogether beyond

what is purely natural (see GRACE).

Finally, a supernatural motive is required because good works must be

supernatural, not only as regards their object and circumstances, but also as

regards the end for which they are performed (ex fine). But, in assigning the

necessary qualities of this motive, theologians differ widely. While some require

the motive of faith (motivum fidei) in order to have merit, others demand in

addition the motive of charity (motivum caritatis), and thus, by rendering the

conditions more difficult, considerably restrict the extent of meritorious works (as

distinguished from merely good works). Others again set down as the only

condition of merit that the good work of the just man, who already has habitual

faith and charity, be in conformity with the Divine law, and require no other

special motive. This last opinion, which is in accordance with the practice of the

majority of the faithful, is tenable, provided faith and charity exert at least an

habitual (not necessarily virtual or actual) influence upon the good work, which

influence essentially consists in this, that man at the time of his conversion

makes an act of faith and of love of God, thereby knowingly and willingly

beginning his supernatural journey towards God in heaven; this intention

habitually retains its influence as long as it has not been revoked by mortal sin.

And, since there is a grave obligation to make acts of faith, hope, and charity

from time to time, these two motives will thereby be occasionally renewed and

revived. For the controversy regarding the motive of faith see Chr. Pesch,

"Prælect. dogmat.", V, 3rd ed. (1908), 225 sqq.; on the motive of charity, see

Pohle, "Dogmatik" II 4th ed. (1909), 565 sqq.

(b) The agent who merits must fulfil two conditions: He must be in the state of

pilgrimage (status viœ) and in the state of grace (status gratiœ). By the state of

pilgrimage is to be understood our earthly life; death as a natural (although not an

essentially necessary) limit, closes the time of meriting. The time of sowing is

confined to this life; the reaping is reserved for the next, when no man will be able

to sow either wheat or cockle. Comparing the earthly life with day and the time

after death with night, Christ says: "The night cometh, when no man can work

[operari]" (John, ix, 4; cf. Eccl., xi, 3; Ecclus., xiv, 17). The opinion proposed by

a few theologians (Hirscher, Schell), that for certain classes of men there may

still be a possibility of conversion after death, is contrary to the revealed truth that

the particular judgment (judicium particulare) determines instantly and definitively

whether the future is to be one of eternal happiness or of eternal misery (cf.

Kleutgen, "Theologie der Vorzeit", II, 2nd ed., Münster, 1872, pp. 427 sqq.).

Baptized children, who die before attaining the age of reason, are admitted to

heaven without merits on the sole title of inheritance (titulus hœreditatis); in the

case of adults, however, there is the additional title of reward (titulus mercedis),

and for that reason they will enjoy a greater measure of eternal happiness.

In addition to the state of pilgrimage, the state of grace (i. e., the possession of

sanctifying grace) is required for meriting, because only the just can be "sons of

God" and "heirs of heaven" (cf. Rom., viii, 17). In the parable of the vine Christ

expressly declares the "abiding in him" a necessary condition for "bearing fruit":

"He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit" (John, xv, 5);

and this constant union with Christ is effected only by sanctifying grace. In

opposition to Vasquez, most theologians are of opinion that one who is holier will

gain greater merit for a given work than one who is less holy, although the latter

perform the same work under exactly the same circumstances and in the same

way. The reason is that a higher degree of grace enhances the godlike dignity of

the agent, and this dignity increases the value of the merit. This explains why

God, in consideration of the greater holiness of some saints specially dear to

Him, has deigned to grant favours which otherwise He would have refused (Job,

xlii, 8; Dan., iii, 35).

(c) Merit requires on the part of God that He accept (in actu secundo) the good

work as meritorious, even though the work in itself (in actu primo) and previous to

its acceptance by God, be already truly meritorious. Theologians, however, are

not agreed as to the necessity of this condition. The Scotists hold that the entire

condignity of the good work rests exclusively on the gratuitous promise of God

and His free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act is devoid of

merit, and with which even mere naturally good works may become meritorious.

Other theologians with Suarez (De gratia, XIII, 30) maintain that, before and

without Divine acceptance, the strict equality that exists between merit and

reward founds a claim of justice to have the good works rewarded in heaven. Both

these views are extreme. The Scotists almost completely lose sight of the

godlike dignity which belongs to the just as "adopted children of God", and which

naturally impresses on their supernatural actions the character of

meritoriousness; Suarez, on the other hand, unnecessarily exaggerates the

notion of Divine justice and the condignity of merit, for the abyss that lies

between human service and Divine remuneration is ever so wide that there could

be no obligation of bridging it over by a gratuitous promise of reward and the

subsequent acceptance on the part of God who has bound himself by His own

fidelity. Hence we prefer with Lessius (De perfect. moribusque div., XIII, ii) and De

Lugo (De incarnat. disp. 3, sect. 1 sq.) to follow a middle course. We therefore

say that the condignity between merit and reward owes its origin to a twofold

source: to the intrinsic value of the good work and to the free acceptance and

gratuitous promise of God (cf. James, i, 12). See Schiffini, "De gratia divina"

(Freiburg, 1901), pp. 416 sqq.

IV. THE OBJECTS OF MERIT

Merit in the strict sense (meritum de condigno) gives a right to a threefold reward:

increase of sanctifying grace, heavenly glory, and the increase thereof; other

graces can be acquired only in virtue of congruous merit (meritum de conqruo).

(a) In its Sixth Session (can. xxxii), the Council of Trent declared: "If any one

saith . . . that the justified man by good works . . . does not truly merit [vere

mereri] increase of grace eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life — if

so be, however, that he depart in grace — and also an increase in glory; let him

be anathema." The expression "vere mereri" shows that the three objects

mentioned above can be merited in the true and strict sense of the word, viz., de

condigno. Increase of grace (augmentum gratiœ) is named in the first place to

exclude the first grace of justification concerning which the council had already

taught: "None of those things, which precede justification — whether faith or

works — merit the grace itself of justification" (Sess. VI, cap. viii). This

impossibility of meriting the first habitual grace is as much a dogma of our Faith

as the absolute impossibility of meriting the first actual grace (see GRACE). The

growth in sanctifying grace, on the other hand, is perfectly evident from both

Scripture and Tradition (cf. Ecclus., xviii, 22; II Cor., ix, 10; Apoc., xxii, 11 sq.).

To the question whether the right to actual graces needed by the just be also an

object of strict merit, theologians commonly answer that, together with the

increase of habitual grace, merely sufficient graces may be merited de condigno,

but not efficacious graces. The reason is that the right to efficacious graces

would necessarily include the strict right to final perseverance, which lies

completely outside the sphere of condign merit although it may be obtained by

prayer (see GRACE). Not even heroic acts give a strict right to graces which are

always efficacious or to final perseverance, for even the greatest saint is still

obliged to watch, pray, and tremble lest he fall from the state of grace. This

explains why the Council of Trent purposely omitted efficacious grace and the gift

of perseverance, when it enumerated the objects of merit.

Life everlasting (vita œterna) is the second object of merit; the dogmatical proof

for this assertion has been given above in treating of the existence of merit. It still

remains to inquire whether the distinction made by the Council of Trent between

vita œterna and vitœ œternœ consecutio is meant to signify a twofold reward:

"life everlasting" and "the attainment of life everlasting", and hence a twofold

object of merit. But theologians rightly deny that the council had this in view,

because it is clear that the right to a reward coincides with the right to the

payment of the same. Nevertheless, the distinction was not useless or

superfluous because, notwithstanding the right to eternal glory, the actual

possession of it must necessarily be put off until death, and even then depends

upon the condition: "si tamen in gratin decesserit" (provided he depart in grace).

With this last condition the council wished also to inculcate the salutary truth

that sanctifying grace may be lost by mortal sin, and that the loss of the state of

grace ipso facto entails the forfeiture of all merits however great. Even the

greatest saint, should he die in the state of mortal sin, arrives in eternity as an

enemy of God with empty hands, just as if during life he had never done

anything, meritorious. All his former rights to grace and glory are cancelled. To

make them revive a new justification is necessary. On this "revival of merits"

(reviviscentia meritorum) see Schiffini, "De gratia divina" (Freiburg, 1901), pp. 661

sqq.; this question is treated in detail by Pohle, "Dogmatik", III (4th ed.,

Paderborn, 1910), pp. 440 sqq.

As the third object of merit the council mentions the "increase of glory" (gloriœ

augmentum) which evidently must correspond to the increase of grace, as this

corresponds to the accumulation of good works. At the Last Day, when Christ

will come with his angels to judge the world, "He will render to every man

according to his works [secundum opera eius]" (Matt., xvi, 27; cf Rom., ii, 6).

And St. Paul repeats the same (I Cor., iii, 8): "Every man shall receive his own

reward, according to his own labour [secundum suum laborem]". This explains

the inequality that exists between the glory of the different saints.

(b) By his good works the just man may merit for himself many graces and

favours, not, however, by right and justice (de condigno), but only congruously

(de congruo). Most theologians incline to the opinion that the grace of final

perseverance is among the objects of congruous merit, which grace, as has been

shown above, is not and cannot be merited condignly. It is better, however, and

safer if, with a view to obtaining this great grace on which our eternal happiness

depends, we have recourse to fervent and unremitting prayer, for Christ held out

to us that above all our spiritual needs he would infallibly hear our prayer for this

great gift (cf. Matt., xxi, 22; Mark, xi, 24; Luke, xi, 9; John, xiv, 13, etc.). For

further explanation see Bellarmine, "De justif.", V, xxii; Tepe, "Instit. theol.", III

(Paris, 1896), 258 sqq.

It is impossible to answer with equal certainty the question whether the just man

is able to merit in advance the grace of conversion, if perchance he should

happen to fall into mortal sin. St. Thomas denies this absolutely: "Nullus potest

sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum neque merito condigni neque

merito congrui" (Summa Theol., I-II, Q. cxiv, a. 7). But because the Prophet Jehu

declared to Josaphat, the wicked King of Juda (cf. II Par., xix, 2 sqq.), that God

had regard for his former merits, almost all other theologians consider it a "pious

and probable opinion" that God, in granting the grace of conversion does not

entirely disregard the merits lost by mortal sin, especially if the merits previously

acquired surpass in number and weight the sins, which, perhaps, were due to

weakness, and if those merits are not crushed, as it were, by a burden of iniquity

(cf. Suarez, "De gratia", XII, 38). Prayer for future conversion from sin is indeed

morally good and useful (cf. Ps., lxx, 9), because the disposition by which we

sincerely wish to be freed as soon as possible from the state of enmity with God

cannot but be pleasing to Him. Temporal blessings, such as health, freedom

from extreme poverty, success in one's undertakings, seem to be objects of

congruous merit only in so far as they are conducive to eternal salvation; for only

on this hypothesis do they assume the character of actual graces (cf. Matt., vi,

33). But, for obtaining temporal favours, prayer is more effective than meritorious

works, provided that the granting of the petition be not against the designs of God

or the true welfare of him who prays . The just man may merit de congruo for

others (e. g., parents, relatives, and friends) whatever he is able to merit for

himself: the grace of conversion, final perseverance, temporal blessings, nay

even the very first prevenient grace (gratia prima prœveniens), (Summa Theol.,

I-II, Q. cxiv, a. 6) which he can in no wise merit for himself. St. Thomas gives as

reason for this the intimate bond of friendship which sanctifying grace establishes

between the just man and God. These effects are immeasurably strengthened by

prayer for others; as it is beyond doubt that prayer plays an important part in the

present economy of salvation. For further explanation see Suarez, "De gratia",

XII, 38. Contrary to the opinion of a few theologians (e. g., Billuart), we hold that

even a man in mortal sin, provided he co-operate with the first grace of

conversion, is able to merit de congruo by his supernatural acts not only a series

of graces which will lead to conversion, but finally justification itself; at all events

it is certain that he may obtain these graces by prayer, made with the

assistance of grace (cf. Ps., l, 9; Tob., xii, 9; Dan., iv, 24; Matt., vi, 14).

For the concept of merit see TAPARELLI, Saggio teoretico del diritto naturale (Palermo, 1842);

Summa theol., I-II, Q. xxi, aa. 3-4; WIRTH, Der Begriff des Meritum bei Tertullian (Leipzig, 1892);

IDEM, Der Verdienstbegriff in der christl. Kirche nach seiner geschichtl. Entwickelung. II: Der

Verdienstbegriff bei Cyprian (Leipzig, 1901). For the Jewish conception of merit see

WEBER-SCHNEDEMANN, Jüdische Theol. (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1897). For merit itself cf. Summa

Theol., I-II, Q. cix, a. 5; Q. cxiv, aa. 1 sqq.; BELLARMINE, De justific., V, i-xxii; SUAREZ, De gratia,

XII, i sqq.; RIPALDA, De ente supernaturali, disp. lxxi-xcvi; BILLUART, De gratia, dissert. viii, aa.

1-5; SCHIFFINI, De gratia divina (Freiburg, 1901), pp. 594 sqq.; PESCH, Prœl. dogmat., V (3rd ed.,

Freiburg , 1908), 215 sqq.; HEINRICH-GUTBERLET, Dogmat. Theologie, VIII (Mainz, 1897);

POHLE, Dogmatik (4th ed., Paderborn, 1909); ATZBERGER, Gesch. der christl. Eschatologie

(Freiburg, 1896); KNEIB, Die Heteronomie der christl. Moral (Vienna, 1903); IDEM, Die "Lohnsucht"

der christl. Moral (Vienna, 1904); IDEM, Die Jenseitsmoral im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen (Freiburg,

1906); ERNST, Die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung. Untersuchungen über die Gottesliebe als

Prinzip der Sittlichkeit und Verdienstlichkeit (Freiburg, 1905); STREHLER, Das Ideal der kathol.

Sittlichkeit (Breslau, 1907); CATHREIN, Die kathol. Weltanschauung in ihren Grundlinien mit

besonderer Berücksichtigung der Moral (2nd ed., Freiburg, 1910).

J. Pohle

Transcribed by Douglas J. Potter

Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume X

Nihil Obstat, October 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org